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Journalists' Interference with Police: The
First Amendment, Access to News and
Official Discretion
By KENT R. MIDDLETON*
Harvey I. Lashinsky, a photographer with the Newark Star-
Ledger, was driving on the Garden State Parkway in New
Jersey when he noticed a broken guardrail and an overturned
car on a sloped embankment. Lashinsky parked his car on the
shoulder of the road, about 150 feet from the wreck, and placed
his press identification in the windshield. He approached the
wreckage and took several photographs.1
When New Jersey State Police Trooper Eric Herkloz arrived
twenty minutes later, he found a crowd of forty to fifty people
gathering around the wreck. Inside the car, a girl was pinned
against the corpse of her decapitated mother. Herkloz immedi-
ately radioed for an ambulance and other police units. Fearing
that spilled fuel might ignite and that bystanders might steal
property or interfere with evidence, Officer Herkloz asked the
crowd, which included Lashinsky, to back away. When Lashin-
sky and fifteen to twenty other spectators refused his request,
Officer Herkloz directed Lashinsky to leave the scene. Lashin-
sky retreated a few feet, but refused to leave, and produced a
press card issued by the state police. After what Trooper Her-
kloz described as a "heated argument,"2 Lashinsky was ar-
rested for "interference" under a New Jersey disorderly
conduct statute.
* Associate Professor, School of Journalism and Mass Communication, Univer-
sity of Georgia; B.A., Michigan State University, 1966; Ph.D., University of Minnesota,
1977.
1. State v. Lashinsky, 81 N.J. 1, 404 A.2d 1121 (1979).
2. Id. at 7, 404 A.2d at 1124. Lashinsky denied there was an argument and stated
that after he displayed his press pass, Trooper Herkloz said, "I don't care at this point,"
asked him again to leave the scene, and then arrested the photographer without giving
him a chance to protest. Id. However, Herkloz and two first aid assistants testified
that during a four-minute argument Lashinsky "hurled expletives" and told the officer
to go away and do his own job and to let Lashinsky do his. Id.
3. NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A:170-29(2)(b) (West 1971), repealed L 1978, c. 95, § 2c:98-2,
eff. Sept. 1, 1979, provided that "Any person who in any place, public or private, ...
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Lashinsky was subsequently prosecuted for "interference"
for having refused to "move on," for having argued with Officer
Herkloz, and for having attracted a crowd to the scene. At his
trial and on appeal, Lashinsky argued that he did not violate
the disorderly conduct statute because he did not directly or
physically interfere with Officer Herkloz, and because he did
not have the necessary "specific intent" to interfere.4 He also
attacked the statute on the grounds that it violated his first
amendment rights as a newsman,5 and that it was unconstitu-
tionally vague and overbroad as applied to newsmen.6 After
review by the New Jersey Supreme Court, all of these argu-
ments were rejected, and his conviction was upheld.7
The Lashinsky opinion is one of the few instances in which a
high court has attempted to resolve the conflict between a jour-
nalist's interest in access to a news scene and a public official's
performance of official duties. This conflict has repeatedly
been resolved in favor of the public official, with no recourse
for the journalist. For example, journalists have been arrested
for interference,8 disorderly conduct,9 assault,10 failure to move
obstructs, molests or interferes with any person lawfully therein. . is a disorderly
person."
Section 2A:170-29(2) (b) has been replaced with N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:29-1 (West 1979).
The latter is titled "Obstructing Administration of Law or Other Governmental Func-
tion" and reads:
A person commits a disorderly persons offense if he purposely obstructs,
impairs or perverts the administration of law or other governmental function
or prevents or attempts to prevent a public servant from lawfully performing
an official function by means of intimidation, force, violence, or physical inter-
ference or obstacle, or by means of any independently unlawful act. This sec-
tion does not apply to flight by a person charged with crime, refusal to submit
to arrest, failure to perform a legal duty other than an official duty, or any
other means of avoiding compliance with law without affirmative interference
with governmental functions.
New § 2C:29-1 appears to be more limited in application than its broadly worded prede-
cessor because it requires a "specific intent" to interfere, specifies less vague criteria of
what constitutes interference, and narrows the class of persons with whom an offender
can interfere. This section also resembles §§ 242.1, 242.2 of the Model Penal Code. See
10 UNIFORM LAws ANNOTATED, Master Ed. (West 1979).
4. Lashinsky, 81 N.J. at 8-9, 404 A.2d at 1125.
5. Id. at 13-15, 404 A.2d at 1127-28.
6. Id. at 15-19, 404 A.2d at 1128-31.
7. Id. at 19, 404 A.2d at 1130-31.
8. See, e.g., Consoli, Tupelo, Miss. cops arrest reporter at KKK rally, EDITOR &
PuB., June 24, 1978, at 12; NBC reporter's police ordinance challenge fails, EDITOR &
PuB., Dec. 6, 1969, at 13; Photographer Arrested While Covering Gun Shot Scene, THE
NEWS & THE LAw, Aug./Sept. 1979, at 55; Public apology issued for photographer's ar-
rest, EDITOR & PuB., Aug. 29, 1981, at 37; McDonald, Cameraman filming housefire ar-
rested, Atlanta J. & Const., Jan. 3, 1982, at lB.
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on," and other violations at news scenes,' 2 because they alleg-
edly interfered with public officials. Often public officials have
simply denied journalists access to news scenes. 13 There are
also reports of officials assaulting journalists and seizing their
equipment. 4 On the other hand, there are many examples of
9. NBC reporter's police ordinance challenge fails, EDITOR & PuB., Dec. 7, 1969, at
13; News Views, NEWS PHOTOGRAPHER, June 1978, at 8; Photographer found innocent,
EDITOR & PuB., April 15, 1978, at 22.
10. Consoli, Tupelo, Miss. cops arrest reporter at KKK rally, EDITOR & PUB., June
25, 1978, at 12.
11. Newsman Arrested Photographing Escaped Convict in Custody, THE NEWS &
THE LAW, Aug./Sept. 1979, at 54; Newsmen to stand trialfor disobeying police, EDITOR &
PuB., May 13, 1978, at 100; News Views, NEWS PHOTOGRAPHER, July 1978, at 2; McDonald,
Cameraman filming house fire arrested, Atlanta J. & Const., Jan. 3, 1982, at lB.
12. See, e.g., McDonald, Cameraman filming house fire arrested, Atlanta J. &
Const., Jan. 3, 1982, at lB (battery); Tupelo, Miss. cops arrest reporter at KKK rally,
EDITOR & PUB., June 24, 1978, at 12 (resisting arrest); Newsman Arrested Photographing
Escaped Convict in Custody, THE NEWS & THE LAW, Aug/Sept. 1979, at 54 (impairing
the flow of traffic).
While the number of reports of police-press confrontations is apparently growing, an
officer in the National Press Photographers Association estimates the number of
"problem situations" as a percentage of incidents covered by the press has remained
about the same. He points out that the number of confrontations has increased be-
cause the number of spot news events covered and the number of photographers cov-
ering them has increased. Seymour, But I Need the Picture, BOOTSTRAP (Region Three,
Nat'l Press Photographers Ass'n) Sept. 1981, at 23.
13. See, e.g., Westinghouse Broadcasting Co. v. Nat'l Transp. Safety Bd., 8 MEDIA L.
REP. (BNA) 1177 (D. Mass. 1982). There may be special situations of access to news
which draw special constitutional consideration, such as courtroom access. For that
reason the scope of this article is limited to access to outdoor news scenes.
14. See, e.g., Ross v. Burns, 5 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 2279 (6th Cir. 1980); (under-
cover agent attempted to seize press photographer's camera and film); Schnell v. City
of Chicago, 407 F.2d 1084 (7th Cir. 1969) (first amendment claim of right to gather news
sufficient to state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 where journalists at 1968
Democratic National Convention sought a permanent injunction to halt police use of
"threats, force, or intimidation" against them); Channel 10, Inc. v. Gunnarson, 337 F.
Supp. 634 (D. Minn. 1972) (unconstitutional prior restraint for police to seize news pho-
tographer's camera without valid warrant). See also, Cameramen Arrested at Plane
Crash Scene: Appeal Filed, THE NEWS & THE LAW, Nov./Dec. 1979, at 60; Photographer
jailed for taking picture, EDITOR & PuB., Dec. 27, 1980, at 13; Photographer pushed, hit
by official and aide, EDITOR & PUB., Dec. 22, 1973, at 11; Photographers'film seized by
police at crash site, EDITOR & PuB., May 30, 1981, at 22; Public apology issuedforphotog-
rapher's arrest, EDITOR & PuB., Aug. 29, 1981, at 37; Reporters harassed, jailed in unre-
lated incidents, EDITOR & PUB., Sept. 26, 1981, at 63; U.S. threatens KQED news crew
with prosecution, Broadcasting, Sept. 1, 1980, at 44; Morley, Reporter's Film Confiscated
At Scene of Pellston Crash, Petoskey (Mich.) News-Review, July 23, 1979, at 1; News
photographer handcuffed, cameras seized by Gables police, Miami News, June 30, 1978,
at 12-D, col. 1.
Private citizens have also assaulted journalists. See Photographers File Charges,
NEWS PHOTOGRAPHER, Sept. 1981, at 4; Plant Official Slugs Photographer. NEWS PHO-
TOGRAPHER, Sept. 1981, at 31; Punching Out the Press, NEWS PHOTOGRAPHER, Sept. 1978,
at 22-25.
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cooperation between police and journalists at news scenes. 15
Indeed, many journalists feel they collaborate too closely with
officials. 6 In any case, public officials seldom allow conflicts
between journalists and officials to ripen into legal disputes;
charges against journalists for interference or disorderly con-
duct are usually dropped. 7 As a result, journalists may be rou-
15. One experienced press photographer, recalling his years on the street, said
that "99.8 percent" of the working police officers he had encountered were "cooperative
and helpful." Seymour, But I need the Picture, BOOTSTRAP (Region Three, Nat'l Press
Photographers Ass'n) Sept. 1981, at 22, 23. Some police departments, recognizing the
important public role of the press, state in their policy manuals that the press should
have maximum access to news events. See, e.g., "Let [the reporter] do his job, so long
as it doesn't interfere with the other people trying to do their jobs .. " Los Angeles
Police Dept., 228.03 Press Relations, Nov. 1980, at 28. The Los Angeles Police Dept.
further noted that reporters who had covered a police shootout with the Symbionese
Liberation Army helped quell inflamatory rumors about police "murder, genocide, and
fascism." Id. at 21.
Journalists have often helped officials at accidents and fires. E.g., Freelance Nabs
Bank Robber, NEWS PHOTOGRAPHER, Dec. 1980, at 17; Helping Hands-News Photogra-
pher Trained as Medic Trades Crash Photo for Woman's Life, NEWS PHOTOGRAPHER,
May 1981, at 36; Stahlberg, Oregon photographer key to capture while police try to con-
fiscate his film, id. at 39; Seattle publisher loses picture but helps in bank robber arrest,
id. at 38; Shoot or help?-A photographer's dilemma, NEWS PHOTOGRAPHER, Feb. 1980,
at 19; Brady, Traffic Helicopter Helps Police Catch Robbery Suspect, Atlanta J. & Const.,
Jan. 30, 1982 at 1B, col. 5.
It is not uncommon for officials to invite reporters and photographers onto private
property at news scenes. See, e.g., Florida Pub. Co. v. Fletcher, 340 So. 2d 914 (1976),
cert. denied, 431 U.S. 930 (1977). However, some courts have found trespass in such
press access. See Anderson v. WROC-TV, 109 Misc. 2d 904, 441 N.Y.S.2d 220 (Sup. Ct.
1981); Prahl v. Brosamle, 98 Wis. 2d 130, 295 N.W.2d 768 (1980).
16. See generally, National News Council, Covering Crime: How Much Press-Po-
lice Cooperation? How Little? 1981.
17. E.g., Photographer Arrested While Covering Gun Shot Scene, THE NEWS & THE
LAW, Aug./Sept. 1979, at 55; Photographer jailed for taking picture, EDITOR & PUB., Dec.
27, 1980, at 13; Police hassle photogs at air crash spot, EDITOR & PUB., March 5, 1977, at
12; Public apology issued for photographer's arrest, EDITOR & PuB., Aug. 29, 1981, at 37;
Sheriffs Mistaken About Picture Ban, EDITOR & PuB., Dec. 11, 1965, at 23; News photog-
rapher handcuffed, cameras seized by Gables police, Miami News, June 30, 1978, at 12-
D.
One commentator argues that police behavior is influenced by the officers' need to
maintain their self-respect, prove their masculinity, and to avoid 'taking any crap' or
being 'taken in.'" J. Wilson, VARIETIES OF POUCE BEHAVIOR 34 (1968). Wilson also
observes that "[t] he vast majority of arrests, and of citizen-police contacts that involve
an offense but do not lead to an arrest, are for such matters as drunkenness, disorderly
conduct, assault, driving while intoxicated, gambling, vandalism, and the like." Id. at 6.
Like arrests, orders to "move on" are often issued so that police officers can "make
their presence known." Moore, Field Interrogation, in The Legitimate Scope of Police
Discretion to Restrict Ordinary Public Activity: A Symposium, 4 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 233, 271 (1969). See also, Meltzer & Trott, Disorderly Conduct, id. at 311.
Davis found in a Chicago study that a policeman is much more likely to arrest for
disorderly conduct knowing that he lacks probable cause but has no intention to ap-
pear in court, than he is likely to: (1) arrest for disorderly conduct while believing that
No. 3] JOURNALISTS' INTERFERENCE
tinely denied access by officials who, journalists argue, have
abused their discretion.18
The conflict between journalists and officials at news scenes
cannot be easily resolved by official access regulations or by
legislation. What constitutes "interference" will depend upon
the dangerousness of the emergency and the conduct of the
journalist. In addition, an officer must retain discretion to
make quick decisions to protect life and property at dangerous
fires, accidents and other disasters. 9 No regulation or law can
precisely define the boundaries of an officer's discretion to ar-
rest for interference or to order citizens away.
Yet, police discretion must be limited if the public interest in
access to news is to be honored. Journalists and other citizens
have a right not to be subject to arbitrary and capricious police
orders regardless of the tensions at a news scene. Unless regu-
he has probable cause and will appear later in court; or (2) that he thinks he has prob-
able cause but will not appear. K. Davis, POLICE DISCRETION 14 (1975). Davis found
officers in Chicago willing to brag about how effectively they used disorderly conduct
statutes to punish through detainment and harassment:
Arrest for disorderly conduct usually is not synonymous with 'invoking the
criminal process' but it is synonymous with imposing punishment-that of be-
ing detained, having to go to the station, having to put up bail or to stay in jail,
and having to appear in court or forfeit the bail money. Most arrests for disor-
derly conduct involve an abuse of power by the arresting officer, as most of the
officers we have interviewed readily acknowledge. Some of them even take
the initiative to boast about how effectively they use the disorderly conduct
statute.
Id. at 14-15.
Courts encourage an officer's abuse of power by placing more credence in the of-
ficer's version of the facts than in the defendant's version. In "The policeman's exer-
cise of discretion to arrest," Model Penal Code commentators observe:
[Arrests ] partake in many respects of the character of a final disposition. The
arrest itself is a sanction. Conviction is quite likely to follow arrest if the of-
ficer presses the matter, since even the more carefully drafted disorderly con-
duct statute leaves considerable room for interpretation and the magistrate is
likely to be sympathetic with the police version of the facts.
MODEL PENAL CODE, § 250.2 Comments at 350 (Final Draft 1980).
18. Former Los Angeles Chief of Police Edward M. Davis once noted, "The biggest
complaint of the press was that we sometimes appeared to be covering up; that some-
one stopped them from taking their shots or getting their story when it didn't seem
necessary ...." Los Angeles Police Dept., 228.03 Press Relations, Nov. 1980, at 3.
19. Although society may not fully recognize police discretion, Goldstein argues
the broad discretion exercised by police officers makes them "among the most impor-
tant policy-makers of our entire society." H. GOLDSTEIN, POLICING A FREE SOCIETY 115
(1977). Police, Wilson writes, "make the effective law" on a subject such as disorderly
conduct. J. WILSON, VARIETIES OF POLICE BEHAVIOR 7 (1968). Moreover, three media
attorneys conclude, "[t]he law all too often is what the police officer with a club or a
gun thinks it is." Middlebrooks, Jones & Shrader, Access, NEWS PHOTOGRAPHER, Dec.
1981, at 16.
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lations and laws are promulgated which limit police discretion,
police can deny journalists access to news scenes without ade-
quate cause.
The need to reconcile police discretion and journalists' ac-
cess has spawned several guidelines for press-police relations
at news scenes. 20 While virtually all of these guidelines pro-
scribe interference, interference is rarely defined.21  Courts
have also failed to define interference adequately. Some
courts have ruled that mere failure to "move on" is interfer-
ence.22 Others have held that a citizen cannot be convicted of
interfering with an officer unless there is evidence of inten-
tional and affirmative physical action.23 As Lashinsky pointed
out, a citizen cannot know what conduct may lead to arrest if
the law is vague or overbroad regarding what constitutes inter-
ference and disorderly conduct.24 The press-police guidelines
will not limit official discretion if the definition of interference
remains unclear.
20. See, e.g., Dallas Police Dept., Public Information; Major Incidents, Crime
Scenes (undated); Dept. of Police, City of Detroit, General Order 76-81, Dissemination
of News (eff. July 1, 1976); Dept. of Pub. Safety, City of Atlanta, Stipulations/News
Media Identification Cards (undated); Houston Police Dept., Police/Media Relations
At Crime Scenes, reprinted in News Release, New Policy Establishes Procedure For
On Scene Media Realtions (sic) (undated); Los Angeles Police Dept., 228.03 Press Re-
lations (Nov. 1980); Metropolitan Police Dept., Dist. of Columbia, General Order, Re-
lease of Information to News Media: Nat'l Press Photographers Ass'n., Suggested
Guidelines for Police/Press Relations, reprinted in Southern Newspaper Pub. Ass'n
Bulletin (May 4, 1981) [hereinafter cited as "NPPA Guidelines"]; New York City Police
Dept., Operations Order 33, Cooperation with News Media (April 13, 1978).
21. For example, the Dallas Police press-police guidelines state that media repre-
sentatives will be denied access to news areas when "in the judgment of the ranking
police officer their presence will interfere with a police operation .... Public Infor-
mation; Major Incidents, Crime Scenes (undated). Similarly, Atlanta regulations
merely state that a member of the media carrying an identification card will be permit-
ted access to an emergency or disorder except in situations "where his/her presence
would materially hinder operations .... .Dept. of Public Safety, City of Atlanta, Stip-
ulations/News Media Identification Cards (undated).
The guidelines of the National Press Photographers Association state that officers
will not restrict press actions at news scenes "unless [press] actions are clearly inter-
fering with an ongoing investigation." NPPA Guidelines, supra, note 20. Like most
police guidelines, the NPPA guidelines do not tell what conduct interferes, but the
guidelines do provide examples of what conduct does not interfere: 'he presence of a
photographer or a reporter at an accident, crime, or disaster scene, and the taking of
pictures or the asking of questions relative to the incident, do not constitute unlawful
interference, and should not be restricted." Id.
See also the discussion of N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:29-1 in note 3, supra, which describes
"interference" in relative detail.
22. See, e.g., People v. Galpern, 259 N.Y. 279, 181 N.E. 572 (1932).
23. See, e.g., Landry v. Daley, 280 F. Supp. 968, 973 (N.D. Ill. 1968).
24. See Notes 96-142 & accompanying text, infra.
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The purpose of this article is to demonstrate that Lashinsky
was wrongly decided. This will be demonstrated first by ex-
posing the New Jersey Supreme Court's failure to recognize
adequately Lashinsky's first amendment interest in news-
gathering. Second, the article will show that Lashinsky may
not be properly convicted of interference under the New
Jersey disorderly conduct statute without proof that he in-
tended to physically obstruct Officer Herkloz in the perform-
ance of official duties. Finally, the New Jersey statute will be
shown to be unconstitutionally vague and overbroad as ap-
plied. In proving that Lashinsky's conviction was improper,
this article will reveal the need for clear and adequate press-
police guidelines which limit police discretion and preserve the
journalist's first amendment interests in newsgathering.
I
Newsgathering and the First Amendment
The New Jersey Supreme Court said Lashinsky's constitu-
tional interests in newsgathering were a "weighty factor" for
the court to consider in determining whether Officer Herkloz's
order to "move on" was reasonable.25 But, as Judge Pashman
argued in his dissent, the majority merely paid "lip service" to
Lashinsky's first amendment interests.26 In effect, the court
decreed that no first amendment rights had been violated by
Lashinsky's arrest. However, having recognized a constitu-
tional right or interest in access to news scenes, the court
should have specified a constitutional standard under which
state officials may abridge that right or interest. The court rec-
ognized that a journalist has a special interest in access to
news scenes, but, by its decision failed to protect that interest.
A. Right of Access to the News Scene
The United States Supreme Court has said that newsmen
"have no constitutional right of access to the scenes of crime or
disaster when the general public is excluded. . . ."I Yet the
court has also recognized that "without some protection for
25. Lashinsky, 81 N.J. at 14, 404 A.2d at 1128.
26. Id. at 21, 404 A.2d at 1131 (Pashman, J., dissenting).
27. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 684-85 (1972). In a series of prison access
cases, the court rejected the proposition that "the Constitution imposes upon govern-
ment the affirmative duty to make available to journalists sources of information not
available to members of the public generally." Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 834-35
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seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be eviscer-
ated."28 The court thus recognizes a first amendment interest
in newsgathering, but has been reluctant to establish a consti-
tutional right.
While there are pitfalls to finding special rights of access for
the press, 29 momentum is gaining in the courts to establish
special newsgathering rights for the media. For example, the
Supreme Court's ruling in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Vir-
ginia,3" creating a first amendment right of access to criminal
trials, may portend a broader first amendment-based right of
access in the press to sources of information under govern-
ment controls. Although Richmond Newspapers only estab-
lished a public right of access to criminal trials,3' Mr. Justice
Stevens viewed the Richmond Newspapers decision as a "wa-
tershed" case protecting the public and the press from abridg-
ment of their rights of access to information about "the
operation of their government" as well.32 Mr. Justice Bren-
nan's "structural model" of the first amendment also suggests
that a public right of access extends beyond access to criminal
trials.33
Even though the Richmond Newspapers decision did not cre-
ate a special right of access for the press, Mr. Justice Brennan
noted that, as a practical matter, "the institutional press is the
likely, and fitting, chief beneficiary of a right of access because
it serves as the 'agent' of interested citizens, and funnels infor-
mation about trials to a large number of individuals."34 In addi-
tion, Mr. Chief Justice Burger noted that the press has enjoyed
(1974). See also Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 429 U.S. 1341 (1977); Saxbe v. Washington
Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974).
28. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. at 681 (1972).
29. For a discussion of the disadvantages of creating special constitutional rights
for journalists, see, Abrams, The Press Is Different: Reflections on Justice Stewart and
the Autonomous Press, 7 HoFsTRA L. REV. 563 (1979); Helle, The News-Gathering/Publi-
cation Dichotomy and Government Expression, DUKE L.J. 1 (1982)i Lewis, A Preferred
Position for Journalism?, 7 HOFSThA L. REV. 595 (1979).
30. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
31. Justices Burger and O'Connor emphasize the limits of the Richmond Newspa-
pers decision in Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 102 S. Ct. 2613, 2624 (Burger,
C.J., dissenting), 2623 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (1982).
32. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 582-584 (Stevens, J., concurring).
33. "[T] he First Amendment embodies more than a commitment to free expres-
sion and communicative interchange for their own sakes; it has a structural role to
play in securing and fostering our republican system of self-government." Id. at 587
(Brennan, J., concurring) (emphasis in original).
34. Id. at 586 n.2.
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"special seating and priority of entry so that [it] may report
what people in attendance have seen and heard. ' 35 The press
may have no more right of access than the general public as a
matter of law, but the press has been routinely granted special
access to many news scenes because of its role as surrogate
news-gatherer for the public.
Although Justice Burger states that the right of access found
in Richmond Newspapers is limited to criminal trials,36 his ra-
tionale for access may justify access to news events outside the
courthouse. Justice Burger argues that courtrooms are among
the public forums in which people have historically had a con-
stitutional right to "listen, observe, and learn" about their gov-
ernment. Arguably the public has a similar right to observe
outdoor news scenes at which public officials also carry out
governmental duties. 8 In fact, the "public forum" theory on
which Justice Burger grounds the right of access to courtrooms
emerged from first amendment cases set in parks and streets
where news events occur.39 Hence, if there is a constitutional
right of access to the courtroom because of its traditional open-
35. Id. at 573.
36. Id. at 564 (distinguishing Gannett by arguing that Richmond is limited to ac-
cess to trials).
37. Id. at 578.
38. Police, no less than judges, carry out duties that are "peculiarly 'governmental'
in character and highly charged with the public interest." Coursey v. Greater Niles
Township Publishing Co., 40 IlM. 2d 257, 265, 239 N.E.2d 837, 841 (1968). "In our opinion,
the very status of the policeman as a public official.. . is tantamount to an implied
consent to informing the general public by all legitimate means regarding his activities
in discharge of public duties." Cassidy v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc., 60
Ill. App. 3d 831, 839, 377 N.E.2d 126, 132 (1978). See also, Meiners v. Moriarity, 563 F.2d
343 (7th Cir. 1977).
39. See generally, Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana,
1965 Sup. CT. REV. 1.
Mr. Justice Stewart, in his concurring opinion in Richmond Newspapers suggested
there may be a stronger need for a right of access for the press and public to courts
than to public streets and sidewalks because of the need to assure judicial integrity in
the courtroom. 448 U.S. at 600. But there is a similar need at crime, accident and other
news scenes to assure the integrity of official proceedings.
However, even if there is a stronger first amendment interest in access to the courts
than to the streets, the scope of permissible first amendment activity would necessar-
ily be narrower in the courtroom than in the streets because, as Justice Stewart noted,
a courtroom "must be a quiet and orderly place." Id. First amendment rights need not
always be exercised in a quiet orderly manner in the streets.
Further, several courts have found a common law right to observe, photograph and
record what one can easily see or overhear in a public place. See, e.g., Harrison v.
Washington Post Co., 391 A.2d 781 (D.C. App. 1978); Jacova v. Southern Radio & Televi-
sion Co., 83 So. 2d 34 (Fla. 1955); Taylor v. K.T.V.B., Inc., 96 Idaho 202, 525 P.2d 984
(1974); Williams v. KCMO Broadcasting Division-Meredith Corporation, 472 S.W.2d 1
No. 31
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ness as a public forum, the right of access might also extend to
outdoor news scenes where the public has historically been al-
lowed to listen, observe and learn.
Further support for an expanded right of access in the press
may be found in lower court decisions. Several lower courts
have cast the press right of access to the news scene in first
amendment terms. 40 A federal district court recently ruled:
[T]he rights guaranteed and protected by the First Amend-
ment include a right of access to news or information concern-
ing the operation and activities of government. This right is
held by both the general public and the press, with the press
acting as a representative or agent of the public as well as on
its own behalf.
4 '
In addition a Colorado judge has argued that telecommunica-
tions have so blurred the distinction traditionally made be-
tween newsgathering and publishing that the first amendment
should extend to all activities necessary to insure adequate
coverage of a news story.'
A special right of access to the news scene for journalists
may emerge from state legislation, as well. For example, Cali-
fornia has codified a special right of access in journalists to
(Kansas City Ct. of Appl. 1971). See, Middleton, Journalists and Tape Recorders. Does
Participant Monitoring Invade Privacy?, 2 COMM/ENT L.J. 287, 296-97 (1979-80).
40. See Schnell v. City of Chicago, 407 F.2d 1084 (7th Cir. 1969) (police attacks on
member of the press interfered with "constitutionally protected activity"); Borreca v.
Fasi, 369 F. Supp. 906, 908 (D. Hawaii 1974) (first amendment freedom of the press
includes a limited right of reasonable access to news); Lewis v. Baxley, 368 F. Supp.
768, 775 (N.D. Ala. 1973) (three-judge panel found that the first amendment right to
publish must logically include a right to gather news.)
In Channel 10 v. Gunnarson, the District Court of Minnesota found that journalists
have "a constitutional right to have access to and to make use of the public streets,
roads and highways . . . for the purpose of observing and recording in writing and
photographically the events which occur therein." 337 F. Supp. 634, 638 (D. Minn. 1972)
(quoting Gazette Pub. Co. v. Cox, Cause No. IP 65-C-528 (S.D. Ind. 1967)). See also,
Dayton Newspapers, Inc. v. Starick, 345 F.2d 677 (6th Cir. 1965); Quad-City Community
News Service v. Jebens, 334 F. Supp. 8 (S.D. Ia. 1971). But see, L.A. Free Press, Inc. v.
City of Los Angeles, 9 Cal. App. 2d 448, 88 Cal. Rptr. 605 (1970).
41. Cable News Network, Inc. v. American Broadcasting Co., Inc., 518 F. Supp. 1238,
1244 (N.D. Ga. 1981). See also Westinghouse Broadcasting Co. v. Nat'l Transp. Safety
Bd., 8 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 1177, 1184 (1982).
42. Allen v. Combined Communications, 7 MEDIA L. REP. 2417, 2449 (Colo. Dist. Ct.
1981). The Colorado District Court further stated:
In an age of instant communication who is to say whether a television reporter
standing in a field reporting his/her story by means of one of those video de-
vices called a "mini cam" or "insta cam" or "live action cam" is at that moment
gathering the news or disseminating it?
Id. at 2449.
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scenes of natural disasters at which public officials may deny
access to the general public.43 Similarly, government agencies
have permitted journalists access to international news scenes
in spite of travel restrictions imposed by those agencies on the
general public to protect national security."
No doubt the best indicator of a special right of access for
journalists is the press pass. Virtually all police, sheriff and
fire departments permit a journalist special access provided
the journalist has a press pass issued by the government
agency. Indeed, possession of a press pass is often required for
special access. 4 Though the courts have been reluctant to rec-
ognize a specific right of access to the news scene, a defacto
right has already been recognized by numerous governmental
agencies.
Unfortunately, whatever constitutional protection may at-
tach to the journalists' interest in newsgathering will be mean-
ingless so long as government officials may freely check that
interest. In most jurisdictions, officials have discretion to make
a good faith determination that journalists should be denied
access to a news scene. If journalists' interest in access is to be
43. CAL. PENAL CODE § 409.5 (West 1970) permits officials to close an area when-
ever "a menace to the public health or safety is created by a calamity such as flood,
storm, fire, earthquake, explosion, accident or other disaster," whenever an area sur-
rounding a command post has been activated for abating a calamity, and punishes one
who "willfully and knowingly" enters a closed area. However, section (d) provides:
"Nothing in this section shall prevent a duly authorized representative of any news
service, newspaper, or radio or television station or network from entering the areas
closed pursuant to this section." Nevertheless, a California court has ruled that a sher-
iff's duty to enforce laws, protect safety and maintain order includes discretion to pro-
hibit reporters from crossing police lines. L.A. Free Press, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 9
Cal. App. 3d 448, 88 Cal. Rptr. 605 (1970), cert. denied 401 U.S. 982 (1971).
Ironically, New Jersey had a strict statutory prohibition against interfering with
news photographers at the time of Lashinsky's arrest. See L. 1934, c. 193, p. 473 re-
pealed by L. 1979, c. 95, $2C:98-2, amended by L. 1979, c. 178 which read: "Any person
who interferes with, assaults, strikes, beats or wounds a news reporter, while such
photographer or reporter is engaged in the pursuit of his occupation, is guilty of a
misdemeanor."
44. When Americans were barred from travel to Cuba, the State Department pro-
vided exceptions for "persons whose travel may be regarded as being in the best inter-
ests of the United States, such as newsmen or businessmen with previously
established business interests." Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 3 (1965). Despite general
travel bans, journalists were allowed to travel to Ethiopia during its war with Italy in
1935, and to Spain during the Spanish Civil War in 1936. Id. at 9.
45. See press-police guidelines, supra, note 20. See also Quad-City Community
Service v. Jebens, 334 F. Supp. 8 (S.D. Ia. 1971), in which the court suggested the pro-
cess under which press passes are issued may raise constitutional questions.
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protected, officials should have to satisfy high and consistent
standards to justify curtailing that interest.
B. The Proper Constitutional Standard for Restricting Access to
News Scenes
Where freedom of speech is at issue, the Supreme Court has
ruled that the state may interfere only if it can satisfy its heavy
burden of proving that the expression presents a clear and
present danger to a legitimate state interest.4 6 However, where
a first amendment right of access is at issue, courts have im-
posed a less demanding though still rigorous test. In Richmond
Newspapers, the Supreme Court said that access to criminal
trials could be denied only if the state can demonstrate an
"overriding interest articulated in findings."47 Some courts
have also required the state to demonstrate that its order to
close a place normally open to the public bears a substantial
nexus to the state interest asserted.' s Furthermore, the state
may be required to show that it has no less restrictive means to
achieve the state interest.
49
On the other hand, where access is sought to places where
the public is generally excluded, for example to grand jury ses-
sions, appellate judicial conferences, and dangerous areas
such as fires, riots and floods, the first amendment standard
may be even less rigorous. It has been said that only a "rea-
sonable" nexus, rather than a substantial nexus, need exist be-
tween the denial of access and the state's asserted interest in
closure of areas that are normally off limits to the public.5 0 Au-
thorities have been required to provide written reasons for de-
nying journalists access to a news scene," but oral restrictions
on media access have been permitted in emergency situa-
tions.52 Whether a "substantial" or a "reasonable" nexus is
46. Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 237 (1963), Terminiello v. Chicago, 337
U.S. 1, 4-5 (1949).
47. 448 U.S. 555, 581 (1980).
48. Lewis v. Baxley, 368 F. Supp. 768, 779 (M.D. Ala. 1973); Allen v. Combined Com-
munications, 7 MEDIA L REP. (BNA) 2417, 2420 (Colo. Dist. Ct. 1981).
49. See, e.g., Lewis v. Baxley, 368 F. Supp. 768, 779 (M.D. Ala. 1973). See also Allen
v. Combined Communications, 7 MEDIA L REP. (BNA) 2417, 2420 (Colo. Dist. Ct. 1981),
in which the court found a strong presumption in favor of protecting the asserted first
amendment interest.
50. Lewis v. Baxley, 368 F. Supp. 768, 779 (M.D. Ala. 1973).
51. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. Nat'l Transp. Safety Bd., 8 MEDIA L.




necessary to deny access to news scenes depends on whether
journalists have a right or a mere first amendment interest in
access. However, in either case, the denying official must jus-
tify his decision, and must consider less restrictive means to
deny access to news scenes that still allow him to protect life
and property.
C. How Did the Lashinsky Court Address the Access Issue?
In Lashinsky, there was no question that Officer Herkloz
faced an emergency of compelling state interest. What is less
clear is whether Herkloz's order to Lashinsky bore a substan-
tial nexus or even a reasonable relationship to the officer's
need to protect life and property. Furthermore, the opinion
does not discuss alternatives to Lashinsky's exclusion or
whether Officer Herkloz's order to Lashinsky was the least re-
strictive alternative which permitted him to control the crowd.
The court's recognition that a journalist's first amendment pre-
rogatives are a "weighty factor" demands such an analysis. In-
stead, the court deferred to Officer Herkloz's judgment,
concluding that he, working alone, could reasonably decide in
good faith that he could not both perform his responsibilities
and permit Lashinsky to remain.53
Similarly, the court did not address Lashinsky's claim that
Officer Herkloz could have performed his job adequately if the
trooper had not initiated a time-consuming and distracting ar-
gument with the photojournalist. For example, the court did
not explain why Officer Herkloz could not have ordered the
crowd to move away without ordering Lashinsky to move. If
several members of the crowd were hesitant to back away, a
second or third firm order to those members could have caused
them to move back yet allowed Lashinsky to remain.
Further, by avoiding first amendment analysis, the New
Jersey court permitted Officer Herkloz to overlook Lashinsky's
press pass. Press passes are issued so that officials might
grant journalists special rights of access without having to in-
terview them first. Press passes are issued only to journalists
believed to be of good character.M Press passes allow officers
53. Lashinsky, 81 NJ. at 15, 404 A.2d at 1128.
54. The Chief of the State Police Information Bureau in New Jersey testified in the
Lashinsky case that a press card "identifies its possessor as a responsible individual
engaged in a task deeply affected with the public interest, and thus as 'an individual
who in the discretion of [a] police officer can proceed beyond that point where the
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at news scenes to assume, unless shown otherwise, that ac-
credited journalists will not steal property, disturb evidence,
interfere or get hurt if permitted access. 5 The Lashinsky court
failed to place any significance on Lashinsky's press pass,
thereby ignoring the special access normally given to
photojournalists of good standing.
II
Did Lashinsky's Conduct Amount to Interference?
Not only did the court fail to recognize Lashinsky's news-
gathering interests in access, it failed to recognize that Lashin-
sky's conduct is not punishable under an interference statute
which can withstand Constitutional scrutiny. Lashinsky ar-
gued that he should not be convicted unless the state proved
that he intentionally and physically interfered with Officer
Herkloz.5 6 The court, however, said Lashinsky could be con-
victed for conduct which did not physically obstruct, but which
impeded, intermeddled or intervened with an officer." Fur-
thermore, the court pointed out that the statute did not require
public goes if it fits in with what is going on at the time.'" Id. at 25-26, 404 A.2d at 1134
(Pashman, J., dissenting).
55. Judge Pashman argued, in his Lashinsky dissent:
Herkloz should have realized that, as a card-carrying member of the press,
defendant was sufficiently mature to evaluate the safety risks posed by the
overturned vehicle and to position himself so as to minimize those risks ....
The majority's holding, to the contrary in effect allows the police to remove
any newsman from the scene of any accident merely because that newsman is
competently performing his job.
Id. at 29, 404 A.2d at 1135.
Similarly, NPPA Guidelines recommend that:
[n] o journalist should be denied access on the basis of public safety. In those
circumstances where the general public has been denied access to an area on
this basis, photographers or reporters should be granted access after first be-
ing cautioned of the risks, and after the officer has received acknowledgment
that the journalist understands the risk. The decision to assume the risk of
danger remains with the journalist.
NPPA Guidelines, supra note 9.
The Atlanta and Dallas departments are among those police departments that as-
sume responsibility to protect newsmen. See NPPA guidelines, supra note 20. The
Miami and Los Angeles departments are among those that permit journalists to as-
sume responsibility for their own safety., Id. Ed Davis, former chief of police of the
Los Angeles Police Department, once joked, "Every reporter has a constitutional right
to get himself killed in this city if he wants to while covering a story, and furthermore
we're long overdue." Letter to the author from Daniel N. Cooke, Press Relations Office,
Los Angeles Police Department, May 4, 1981, a copy of which is on file at CoMM/ENr.
56. Lashinsky, 81 N.J. at 8-9, 404 A.2d at 1125.
57. Id. at 9, 404 A.2d at 1125.
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a showing of criminal intent to interfere, 8 and found that in
light of all the surrounding circumstances, the trial court could
conclude that the officer's order was reasonable 9 and given in
good faith. The court stated that Lashinsky interfered by fail-
ing to move on,60 by arguing with Officer Herkloz 61 and by at-
tracting a crowd to the scene.62 However, the court erred in
declaring that failing to move on, arguing with an officer or at-
tracting a crowd amounts to interference.
A. Failure to Move On
The New Jersey court was ambivalent about whether failure
to move on, alone, is interference. On the one hand, the court
said that where an officer issues a reasonable order, a citizen
has a "correlative duty to obey."63 On the other hand, the court
said failure to move on does not violate the disorderly persons
statute unless the refusal "results in an obstruction of the per-
58. Id. at 11, 404 A.2d at 1126-27.
59. Id. at 10, 404 A.2d at 1126.
60. The press photographer was "properly convicted as a disorderly person," the
court said, "for his refusal to heed a police officer's order to move back from the imme-
diate vicinity of a gory, fatal automobile accident." Id. at 5-6, 404 A.2d at 1123. The
court further stated:
The gravity of the accident, in which one of the victims was still alive, but
possibly succumbing, made it imperative to clear the area for additional ambu-
lance and police assistance. The possibility that fire might break out was an-
other obvious reason for ordering the dispersal. General law enforcement
responsibilities, heightened by the presence of personal property and valu-
ables strewn about, made the officer's concern for preserving the scene of the
accident apparent. The problems of crowd control faced by Herkloz, the only
police officer there, anxiously awaiting assistance, were real, substantial, obvi-
ous and exigent .... His order to Lashinsky to withdraw was clearly reason-
able. Lashinsky's dogged and willful refusal to obey that order was palpably
unreasonable.
Id. at 12, 404 A.2d at 1127.
61. The immediate cause of Lashinsky's arrest was the "heated argument, lasting
about three to four minutes, during which Lashinsky hurled expletives at Herkloz and
told the officer to go away and do his own job and let Lashinsky do his." Id. at 7, 404
A.2d at 1124.
Herkloz testified that "had it not been for the altercation with Lashinsky, he would
have spent that time giving first aid to the victim still inside the vehicle and assisting
the person already providing first aid." Id. at 8, 404 A.2d at 1125.
62. Herkloz testified that during the argument, other spectators, who had begun
leaving the scene, "stopped ... and turned around and paid attention to the defendant
who was screaming at [him]." Id. at 8, 404 A.2d at 1125. The crowd was also allegedly
attracted by the taking of pictures: "Defendant's presence at the scene at that time,
taking pictures in close proximity to the victims and the car wreck, could not help but
to attract the crowd's attention and make the officer's job more difficult." Id. at 12, 404
A.2d at 1127.
63. Id. at 11, 404 A.2d at 1126.
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formance of the officer's proper tasks."64
At one time it could be said that failure to comply with a po-
lice order to move on or disperse would constitute obstruction
or resistance regardless of other evidence of interference.6" In
the widely cited case of People v. Galpern,66 a case noted in
Lashinsky, the New York Court of Appeals upheld a disorderly
conduct conviction where a man conversing quietly on a nearly
empty New York sidewalk refused an officer's order to move
on.67 However, cases since Galpern have not found failure to
obey an order, absent evidence of interference or an attempt to
interfere, to warrant conviction for disorderly conduct.
In Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham,68 the United States
Supreme Court declared a local ordinance, which made it un-
64. Id.
65. Note, Types of Activity Encompassed by the Offense of Obstructing a Public
Officer, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 388, 401 (1960). See also Rachlin, The Police Order: The Right
to Disobey, 6 SANTA CLARA LAw. 136 (1966).
66. 259 N.Y. 279, 181 N.E. 572 (1932).
67. Galpern was found guilty under a statute which punished one who "with intent
to provoke a breach of the peace, or whereby a breach of the peace may be occasioned
... congregates with others on a public street and refuses to move on when ordered
by the police." Id. at 283, 121 N.E. at 573. Galpern had congregated with five or six
friends on a late summer night on East Fourteenth Street in New York City to conduct
"social conversation." Id. at 281, 121 N.E. at 573. According to the Court of Appeals,
Galpern acted in "an orderly and inoffensive way." Id. at 284, 121 N.E. at 573. A magis-
trate found that, contrary to charges against him, Galpern had "used no threatening,
abusive or insulting language," that his behavior was not "insulting or threatening,"
and that he had "no intent to provoke a breach of the peace." Id. at 281, 121 N.E. at 572.
Nevertheless, Galpern was convicted for obstructing the sidewalk even though there
was no evidence presented that other groups standing nearby had been obstructed or
bothered in any way. Id. at 284, 121 N.E. at 573. The arrest arose out of a dispute dur-
ing which Galpern "asserted a right to stand upon the sidewalk of a street in quiet
orderly conversation with a group of friends ... ." Id. at 281, 121 N.E. at 572.
Basing its decision almost entirely on the belief that the officer's order was author-
ized, id. at 284, 121 N.E. at 573, the Court of Appeals sanctioned almost complete discre-
tion for police in such cases:
Friends may congregate on the sidewalk in an orderly group for a short con-
versation, without creating disorder or unduly offending or obstructing others,
but they must "move on" when a police officer so directs for the purpose of
avoiding possible disorder which otherwise might ensue. The Legislature has
provided that failure to obey such direction in itself is disorderly conduct.
That provision tends to preserve public order on the streets of a great city. A
refusal to obey such an order can be justified only where the circumstances
show conclusively that the police officer's direction was purely arbitrary and
was not calculated in any way to promote the public order... . The courts
cannot weigh opposing considerations as to the wisdom of the police officer's
directions when a police officer is called upon to decide whether the time has
come in which some directions are called for.
Id. at 284-85, 121 N.E. at 573-74.
68. 382 U.S. 87 (1965).
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lawful to "stand or loiter" after having been requested by a po-
lice officer to move on, unconstitutionally overbroad.69 The
Court declared that one could not be arrested merely for fail-
ing to obey an officer's order to move on.70 To avoid unconstitu-
tional overbreadth, the Court said the state must demonstrate
that the accused had blocked "free passage."'" Justices Doug-
las and Fortas went further in their concurring opinions, argu-
ing that even if the statute were narrowly construed, it would
be unconstitutional as applied in the Shuttlesworth case.
"[U]nless petitioner's presence on the street was itself
enough," Justice Douglas said, failure to obey an order to move
on after one's friends had dispersed "certainly cannot be made
a crime. . . when one is not acting unlawfully."72 The Shuttles-
worth opinion demonstrates that an independent journalist,
even though ordered to disperse as part of a group, has not
committed disorderly conduct by refusing to move on, unless
his presence at the scene was unlawful.
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In several other cases, the Supreme Court has found the de-
fendant committed neither disorderly conduct nor interference
69. Id. at 90.
70. Id. at 91.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 96 (Douglas, J., concurring). See also Columbus v. Waterman, 41 Ohio
App. 2d 98, 322 N.E.2d 291 (1974) (not interference to fail to obey order to move where
the arrest of a third person was complete, the arrestee was in a paddy wagon and the
defendant was some 40 feet away simply watching the proceedings). Even where Gal-
pern is cited approvingly there is usually more evidence of interference than was
found in Galpern's passive behavior. See, e.g., People v. Todaro, 26 N.Y.2d 325, 310
N.Y.S.2d 303 (1970) (defendant recklessly created risk of disorderly conduct by using
"abusive and obscene language" in response to several requests to move from "one of
the busiest street corners in the world." Id. at 327, 329, 310 N.Y.S.2d at 305, 306.
73. Frequently, failure to move on is punishable if one "congregates," or is "in a
gathering" and fails to heed an officer's order to disperse. E.g., Colten v. Kentucky, 407
U.S. 104 (1972). A Kentucky statute made a person guilty of disorderly conduct if,
"with intent to cause public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating
a risk thereof, he,. . . (f) Congregates with other persons in a public place and refuses
to comply with a lawful order of the police to disperse." Id. at 108, citing KY. REV. STAT.
§ 437-016(1)(f) (Supp. 1968). See also, N.Y. PENAL LAw § 240.20(7) (McKinney 1980),
the Chicago Municipal Code, § 193-1(d) cited in City of Chicago v. Weiss, 51 Ill. 2d 113,
281 N.E.2d 310, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 896 (1972), and the MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.7
(Final Draft 1980).
It has been held not to be disorderly conduct to fail to disperse where it was not
established that defendant was a member of a group being disorderly, e.g., People v.
Sharky, 57 Misc. 2d 558, 293 N.Y.S.2d 262 (Nassau County Ct. 1968), but it has also been
held to be disorderly conduct to fail to disperse even though defendant apparently was
not himself part of a disorderly group. City of Chicago v. Weiss, 51 In. 2d 113, 281
N.E.2d 310, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 896 (1972); Chicago v. Greene, 47 IIl. 2d 30, 264 N.E.2d
162 (1970); (Chicago Municipal Code 193-1(d)).
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in failing to obey an order to move on or disperse. The Court
ruled it is not disorderly conduct to fail to move on where a
racially motivated order to leave a public basketball court vio-
lated the equal protection clause.74 The Court also ruled it is
not interference to refuse to obey an inspector's order to open
a door where the defendant stated a significant fourth amend-
ment purpose in refusing.7" In addition, the Court overturned
the disorderly conduct conviction of a man who verbally rebuf-
fed a police officer, ruling not only that refusal to approach the
officer was not disorderly conduct but that the defendant's
"nonprovocative" protest of the order was constitutionally pro-
tected expression.76 These cases suggest that a journalist who
has a first amendment purpose in gathering news may ques-
tion a police order without facing arrest for failure to move on.
Similarly, a journalist, like any citizen, has a first amendment
interest in protesting an order which he thinks is invalid.77
Thus, failure to obey an order to move on may be permitted as
a legitimate assertion of a constitutional right or interest.
B. Arguing With an Officer
The immediate cause of Lashinsky's arrest was the "heated
argument," lasting three to four minutes, during which Lashin-
sky hurled expletives at Herkloz and told the officer to "go
away and do your job and let me do mine. '"78 Herkloz testified
that had it not been for the altercation with Lashinsky, he
could have spent that time giving first aid to the victim still in-
side the car. Moreover, the court found that Lashinsky's argu-
ment and picture-taking attracted a disruptive crowd.79
In ruling against Lashinsky, the New Jersey Supreme Court
failed to recognize that journalists (or private citizens) have a
first amendment right to express disagreement with an of-
ficer's order. The first amendment protects not only "non-
provocative" protests against a police order,"0 but most "heated
arguments" as well. Spoken words are protected under the
first amendment "no matter how rude, abusive, offensive, deri-
74. Wright v. Georgia, 373 U.S. 284 (1963).
75. District of Columbia v. Little, 339 U.S. 1 (1950).
76. Norwell v. City of Cincinnati, 414 U.S. 14 (1973).
77. Id. See also notes 81-88 infra and accompanying text.
78. Lashinsky, 81 N.J. at 7, 404 A.2d at 1124.
79. Id. at 8, 12, 404 A.2d at 1125, 1127.
80. Norwell v. City of Cincinnati, 414 U.S. 14 (1973).
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sive, vulgar, insulting, crude, profane or opprobrious."'" How-
ever, the United States Supreme Court has carved out an
exception to this rule where one uses "fighting words," those
"personally abusive epithets which, when addressed to the or-
dinary citizen, are, as a matter of common knowledge, inher-
ently likely to provoke violent reaction." 82  Prevention of a
violent response by the addressee, it has been said, "is the only
acceptable rationale for regulating offensive speech in a public
place. 83 Thus, Lashinsky was wrongly convicted for arguing
with Herkloz, because the prosecution failed to prove that
Lashinsky's language constituted "fighting words."
However, expletives do not necessarily constitute fighting
words.84 Furthermore, the fighting words doctrine arguably
does not apply where abusive language has been addressed to
a policeman. A properly trained officer, Justice Powell wrote,
"may reasonably be expected to 'exercise a higher degree of
restraint' than the average citizen, and thus be less likely to
respond belligerently to 'fighting words.' ,85 In any case,
Lashinsky was not arrested for, or charged with, uttering fight-
ing words.
If addressing fighting words to a police officer is a weak
ground for arrest for disorderly conduct, mere argument, such
as that between Officer Herkloz and Lashinsky, is an even
81. City of Cincinnati v. Karlan, 39 Ohio St. 2d 107, 109-10, 314 N.E.2d 162, 164 (1974).
82. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971). See also, Chaplinsky v. New Hamp-
shire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
83. MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.2, comments at 345 (Final Draft 1980).
84. E.g., People v. Gingello, 67 Misc. 2d 224, 324 N.Y.S.2d 122 (Rochester City Ct.
1971) (not disorderly conduct under New York law to say in a loud clear voice to an
officer, "you are an asshole").
85. Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 135 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring).
The peace officer is trained to a professional standard of behavior that ordi-
nary citizens might not be expected to equal. Furthermore, the policeman's
career brings him into continual contact with the belligerent and the uncivil.
This experience may render him less likely to fly into a rage and respond to
insulting words with physical violence. These reasons may alone be persua-
sive, but advocates of a special standard for fighting words addressed to a
peace officer also confess to a fear of abusive prosecution if no such adjust-
ment is made.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.4 comment at 366 (Final Draft 1980). See also, People v. Jus-
tus, 57 Ill. App. 3d 164, 372 N.E.2d 1115 (1978); People v. Benders, 63 Misc. 2d 572, 312
N.Y.S.2d 603 (Buffalo City Ct. 1970); Oratowski v. Civil Service Comm'n., 3 Ill. App. 2d
551, 123 N.E.2d 146 (1954). But see, People v. Cuomo, 70 Misc. 2d 757, 335 N.Y.S.2d 219
(Crim. Ct. of City of New York, N.Y. County 1972). See generally, Note, Constitutional
Law-The "Fighting Words Doctrine" Is Applied to Abusive Language Toward Police-
man, 22 DE PAuL L REV. 725 (1973) (author proposes a clear and present danger test).
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weaker ground. In fact, the Supreme Court found in Thompson
v. City of Louisville16 that merely arguing with a police officer
is not disorderly conduct as a matter of substantive law.87 The
Court found no evidence that Thompson's conduct "adversely
affected the good order and tranquility of the city of
Louisville."88
Journalists should not be put in a defensive position about
questioning a police officer's order. If a journalist considers an
order unreasonable, his constitutional interest in newsgather-
ing obliges him to challenge the order. Otherwise, he sacrifices
his first amendment interests in gathering and reporting news
to the public. Further, the journalist's right should not be for-
feited merely because an officer thinks the situation is an
emergency rendering obvious the need to deny access to a
news scene. s9 Such reasoning permits the officer to infringe on
journalists' first amendment access interests whenever he is
confident that a court would deem his actions to be "reason-
able." Because the court's standard of reasonableness is de-
cidedly weighted toward official discretion, officers, practically,
have unlimited discretion to deny access.
C. Attracting Crowds
A third reason given for Lashinsky's conviction was his at-
traction of the crowd by arguing with Herkloz and taking pic-
tures. The New Jersey Supreme Court said that the crowd
"could not help but ... make the officer's job more difficult."'9
Among other things an officer has a responsibility to protect
life and property by ordering passersby to leave the sites of
dangerous accidents. However, the Lashinsky court failed to
86. 362 U.S. 199, 206 (1960).
87. Id. at 205-06. The only evidence of disorderly conduct in Thompson was a sin-
gle statement by an officer that the defendant was argumentative after being taken out
of a cafe. But, the court said:
There is no testimony that petitioner raised his voice, used offensive language,
resisted the officers or engaged in any conduct of any kind likely in any way to
adversely affect the good order and tranquility of the City of Louisville ...
We assume, for we are justified in assuming, that merely "arguing" with a
policeman is not, because it could not be, "disorderly conduct" as a matter of
the substantive law of Kentucky.
Id. See also, Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157 (1961).
88. See Thompson v. City of Louisville, 362 U.S. 199, 206 (1960).
89. See Lashinsky, 81 N.J. at 18, 404 A.2d at 1130 (the court approved this
rationale).
90. Id. at 12, 404 A.2d at 1127.
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explain why Lashinsky was held responsible for the interfer-
ence caused by the gathering crowd.
There are a variety of reasons the crowd may have gathered
other than curiosity about Lashinsky's picturetaking. Curious
passing motorists may stop to watch a rescue operation or to
render aid regardless of whether a journalist is taking pictures
or arguing with an officer. The court did not suggest that
Lashinsky deliberately attempted to attract a crowd or en-
couraged it to be disruptive." To the contrary, the trial court
record indicated Lashinsky retreated somewhat upon Her-
kloz's request to disperse, and that Lashinsky did not initiate
their argument. Thus, the court could not reasonably conclude
that Lashinsky's conduct was responsible for the crowd's
formation.
The New Jersey court failed to explain why Lashinsky
should be held responsible for the interference caused by the
crowd. Several courts have ruled that one engaged in an argu-
ment is not a disorderly person merely because passersby con-
gregate out of curiosity.2 Similarly, courts have ruled that one
is not necessarily a disorderly person because others may be-
come agitated or may disapprove of his conduct.93 Moreover,
where first amendment rights are at issue, the Supreme Court
has ruled that an officer has a responsibility to control onlook-
ers, if possible, before curbing first amendment activities.' As
Judge Pashman pointed out in his dissenting opinion in
Lashinsky, it is absurd to require a media representative to
91. But cf., Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104 (1972), where the U.S. Supreme Court
upheld a Kentucky Court of Appeals conviction for disorderly conduct where the de-
fendant encouraged some 15 other students to stay at the scene where police were
issuing a citation, id. at 106-07, thereby blocking a traffic lane and causing "inconven-
ience and annoyance" to other travelers. Id. at 109. Police officers, the Supreme Court
said, are entitled to enforce traffic laws "free from possible interference or interruption
from bystanders, even those claiming a third-party interest in the transaction." Id.
Note that Colten "blocked free passage," a factor on which the Shuttlesworth Court
placed great emphasis. See notes 70-73 & accompanying text, supra.
92. People v. Justus, 57 Ill.. App. 3d 164, 372 N.E.2d 1115 (1978); People v. Gentry, 48
Ill. App. 3d 900, 363 N.E.2d 146 (1977); People v. Douglas, 29 Ill. App. 3d 738, 331 N.E.2d
359 (1975); City of Chicago v. Blakemore, 15 Ill. App. 3d 994, 305 N.E.2d 687 (1973); Peo-
ple v. Suriwka, 2 IlM. App. 3d 384, 276 N.E.2d 490 (1971); People v. Gingello, 67 Misc. 2d
224, 324 N.Y.S.2d 122 (Rochester City Ct. 1971); People v. Pritchard, 27 N.Y.2d 246, 317
N.Y.S.2d 4, 265 N.E.2d 532 (1970); City of Chicago v. Wender, 46 111. 2d 20, 262 N.E.2d 470
(1970).
93. See Wright v. Georgia, 373 U.S. 284, 293 (1963); Taylor v. Commonwealth, 187
Va. 214, 46 S.E.2d 384 (1948).




forfeit his special right of access because a crowd, over whose
actions he has no control, refused to abide by a reasonable po-
lice request to move on.95
In fact, most of the crowd did obey Officer Herkloz's request
to move on. Those who hesitated to obey and remained with
Lashinsky might have retreated had a second or third firm re-
quest followed the first. Hence, the court's view that Lashin-
sky interfered by attracting a crowd is incorrect, unless
accompanied by a finding that Lashinsky intentionally at-
tracted a crowd or caused it to be disruptive.
III
The Constitutionality of the New Jersey
Disorderly Conduct Statute
A. Vagueness and Overbreadth
A third reason the New Jersey Supreme Court should have
overturned Lashinsky's conviction is that the disorderly con-
duct statute under which he was convicted was unconstitution-
ally overbroad and vague. A statute that is vague or overbroad
can be struck down on its face 96 or as applied.97 A disorderly
conduct statute may be unconstitutionally applied if the stat-
ute is not given a constitutionally narrow interpretation,98 or if
it leads to a conviction for conduct which may not constitution-
ally be punished.99 Although vagueness and overbreadth are
conceptually distinct, each applies to those circumstances in
which there is a "lack of fair warning to the public, unbridled
discretion in the application of the statute by law enforcement
officers, and a 'chilling effect' upon exercise of First Amend-
ment rights."'100 Courts scrutinize statutes for vagueness when
95. Lashinsky, 81 N.J. at 28, 404 A.2d at 1135.
96. E.g., Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972).
97. Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87 (1965).
98. Id.
99. E.g., Thompson v. City of Louisville, 362 U.S. 199 (1960); Garner v. Louisiana,
368 U.S. 157 (1961).
100. Livingston v. Garmire, 437 F.2d 1050, 1055 (5th Cir. 1971). Vagueness is whether
the terms of the rules were sufficiently precise to "give the person of ordinary intelli-
gence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act accord-
ingly." Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972). "Overbreadth" may be
found if the "statute's very existence may cause others not before the court to refrain
from constitutionally protected speech or expression." Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413
U.S. 601, 612 (1973). At the very least, vagueness and overbreadth frequently "overlap"
in the area of free speech, MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.2.4(c), n.45 (Final Draft 1980). See
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first amendment issues are at stake.1 1
Lashinsky charged that the disorderly conduct statute was
vague as applied to him, but the court ruled that, "as a matter
of common intelligence," a photographer would realize his re-
fusal to obey an order at an emergency came within the disor-
derly persons statute.102 The court also found that the statute
was not so broad as to restrict constitutionally protected activ-
ity, and that Officer Herkloz's order was "plainly reasonable in
objective terms because an actual interference did occur."103
The court did not address whether the statute was overbroad
and vague as written. However, Lashinsky argued that he
could not be convicted under the disorderly conduct statute
because the law was not limited to punishment of intentional
physical interference. 101 Although the court responded that
Lashinsky's interpretation of the statute was "overly nar-
row," 0 5 other courts and legislatures have stipulated that mis-
demeanor disorderly conduct statutes, to be constitutional,
require a showing of intent to cause physical obstruction.0 6
Likewise, the Model Penal Code recommends such a limitation
for an interference statute.
0 7
generally, Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARv. L. REV. 844
(1970); Note, The Void-For- Vagueness Doctrine In The Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L.
REV. 67 (1960).
101. Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U.S. 195, 200 (1966).
102. Lashinsky, 81 N.J. at 18, 404 A.2d at 1130.
103. Id. The New Jersey Supreme Court has also determined that the good faith use
of discretion by the officer is necessary for conviction. (See annotation to N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2A:170-29A (West 1971)).
104. Lashinsky, 81 N.J. at 8-9, 404 A.2d at 1125.
105. Id. at 9, 404 A.2d at 1125.
106. See Bishop v. Golden, 302 F. Supp. 502, 506 (E.D.N.Y. 1969); Landry v. Daley, 280
F. Supp. 938, 959 (N.D. Ill. 1968).
Judge Pashman, in his dissent in Lashinsky, observed that the New Jersey Supreme
Court's "better reasoned decisions" had upheld convictions for unlawful interference
with policemen only where a defendant had "purposely obstructed an officer's per-
formance of his duties, or physically prevented the officer from carrying out such re-
sponsibilities." 81 N.J. at 22, 404 A.2d at 1132 (Pashman, J., dissenting). The present
New Jersey disorderly conduct statute punishes purposeful or physical obstruction.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:29-1. See note 3 & accompanying text, supra.
107. Section 242.1 of the Model Penal Code, "Obstructing Administration of Law or
Other Governmental Function," reads:
A person commits a misdemeanor if he purposely obstructs, impairs or per-
verts the administration of law or other governmental function by force, vio-
lence, physical interference or obstacle, breach of official duty, or any other
unlawful act, except that this Section does not apply to flight by a person
charged with crime, refusal to submit to arrest, failure to perform a legal duty
other than an official duty, or any other means of avoiding compliance with law
without affirmative interference with governmental functions.
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In sum, had the New Jersey Supreme Court more closely
scrutinized the disorderly conduct statute, it would have found
the statute unconstitutional for three reasons: (1) the statute
failed to distinguish between disorderly conduct and interfer-
ence; (2) the statute did not require proof of physical obstruc-
tion; and (3) the statute did not require proof of intent to
interfere.
B. Distinguishing Interference from Disorderly Conduct
Disorderly conduct is the statutory offspring of the common
law offense of breach of the peace. 10 8 "Disorderly conduct"
therefore encompasses conduct that causes "public inconven-
ience, annoyance or alarm."'1 9 "Interference," on the other
hand, does not necessarily cause the same public disturbance.
"Interference," which is synonymous with "obstruction," how-
ever, is a more direct and immediate offense. For example, the
MODEL PENAL CODE § 242.1 (Final Draft 1980).
In comments, drafters of the code noted that the "generality" of the obstruction sec-
tion was "balanced" by the requirement that the defendant be shown to have pur-
posely obstructed, impaired or perverted the administration of law. MODEL PENAL
CODE § 242.1, comment at 204 (Final Draft 1980). Drafters of the model code concluded
that the intent requirement is "perhaps the most important general limitation" on the
scope of the disorderly conduct offense. MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.2 comment at 328
(Final Draft 1980).
108. MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.2 comment at 325 (Final Draft 1980).
109. In the Model Penal Code, one would be guilty of disorderly conduct if
with purpose to cause public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly
creating a risk thereof, he: (a) engages in fighting or threatening, or in violent
or tumultuous behavior; or (b) makes unreasonable noise or offensively
coarse utterance, gesture or display, or addresses abusive language to any per-
son present; or (c) creates a hazardous or physically offensive condition by
any act which serves no legitimate purpose of the actor.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.2 (Final Draft 1980).
The Model Penal Code defines "public" as "affecting or likely to affect persons in a
place to which the public or a substantial group has access." MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 250.2 (Final Draft 1980). The code would not make criminal the disturbance of "any
person" as the New Jersey statute under which Lashinsky was convicted would. Id.
comment at 329.
Under the New York disorderly conduct statute, disorderly conduct is, inter alia,
"violent, tumultuous or threatening behavior" carried out "With intent to cause public
inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof." Hechtman,
in his practice commentary, noted that in the revision, begging and loitering were re-
moved from the disorderly conduct statute because they did not cause the "breach of
the peace" essential to that offense. N.Y. PENAL LAw, § 240.20 practice commentary at
263 (McKinney 1980).
In Illinois, a person commits disorderly conduct when he knowingly does "any act in
such unreasonable manner as to alarm or disturb another and to provoke a breach of
the peace;" ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 26-1 (Smith-Hurd 1979).
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Model Penal Code defines interference as where one "pur-
posely obstructs, impairs or perverts the administration of law
or other governmental function by force, violence, physical in-
terference or obstacle." 110
Conduct which obstructs or interferes does not necessarily
cause the "breach of the peace" necessary for disorderly con-
duct, while disorderly conduct does not necessarily cause the
obstruction which characterizes interference."' In New York,
for example, where the law distinguishes between disorderly
conduct and interference, even noisy arguments will not neces-
sarily be disorderly conduct if they do not occur on public
property ' 2 or do not disturb more than a few people. ' 3 Even a
fist fight in a public place may not be disorderly conduct in
New York if it is not conducted with an intent to cause a gen-
eral breach of the peace." 4
The New Jersey statute in Lashinsky did not distinguish dis-
orderly conduct and interference. The statute provided for
punishment for disorderly conduct if "in any place, public or
110. See supra note 107.
111. However, with the requisite intent, disorderly conduct might become interfer-
ence as when a disorderly crowd that is blocking an intersection intentionally refuses
to move on. E.g., U.S. ex rel Raby v. Woods, 440 F.2d 478 (7th Cir. 1971).
112. E.g., People v. Munafo, 50 N.Y.2d 326, 406 N.E.2d 780, 438 N.Y.S.2d 924 (1980)
(not disorderly where farmer fired gun across path of power authority truck on se-
cluded stretch of his own property in front of a small number of people); People v.
O'Neal, 93 Misc. 2d 953, 404 N.Y.S.2d 2505 (City of Rome 1978) (city ordinance allowing
punishment for disorderly conduct on private property unconstitutional because state
law allows conviction only for public disorderly conduct).
But in Illinois, "[n]o attempt has been made to limit the scope of the disorderly
conduct article to public acts." ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 38, § 26-1 (Smith-Hurd 1978) (com-
mittee comments). See People v. Davis, 82 Ill. 2d 534, 413 N.E.2d 413 (1980) (disorderly
conduct to enter dwelling of 81-year-old woman, wavings sheets of paper and threaten-
ing her to drop complaint filed against defendant's brother).
113. E.g., People v. Munafo, 50 N.Y.2d 326, 406 N.E.2d 780, 428 N.Y.S.2d 924 (1980)
(not disorderly conduct where farmer fired gun across path of power authority truck
on secluded stretch of his own property in front of a small number of people); People v.
Chesnick, 302 N.Y. 58, 96 N.E.2d 87 (1950) (argument heard by three persons in apart-
ment building is not disorderly conduct because there was "no troubling of the wonted
calm of the whole community," 302 N.Y. at 61, 96 N.E.2d at 89); People v. Canner, 88
Misc. 2d 85, 388 N.Y.S.2d 812, afrd, 40 N.Y.2d 886, 357 N.E.2d 1926, 389 N.Y.S.2d 361 (1976)
(private conduct to which two occupants of only two apartments complain is not disor-
derly conduct).
114. E.g., in People v. Pritchard, 27 N.Y.2d 246, 265 N.E.2d 532, 317 N.Y.S.2d 4 (1970),
the Court of Appeals ruled that a fist fight in a dance hall was not disorderly conduct
because, as a confrontation between two individuals, it was not carried out with the
intent to cause a breach of the peace. Offensive words addressed to no one in paticular
have also been ruled not to be fighting words which could cause a violent response.
Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
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private" a person "obstructs, molests, or interferes with any
person lawfully therein.""' 5 Under the New Jersey statute, the
range of conduct that might be disorderly was almost without
limit. The fact that conduct could be disorderly "in any place,
public or private" meant that disorderly conduct might be
found in any argument between any two people within any pri-
vate dwelling. Thus, one could be convicted of disorderly con-
duct if one interfered with "any person" in a private
altercation, even if the altercation caused no general disorder.
Journalists, in the course of gathering news, seldom engage
in the raucous behavior which characterizes disorderly con-
duct. Even a loud argument between a journalist and an officer
would not be considered disorderly conduct under a carefully
drafted disorderly conduct statute proscribing behavior that
causes a breach of the peace. Under a constitutionally narrow
statute, a journalist might occasionally be arrested for interfer-
ence, but almost never for disorderly conduct. A narrowly
drafted statute, however, would require that even arrest for in-
terference must be based on evidence of physical obstruction
and intent to interfere.
C. Physical Obstruction
An interference statute which prohibits only physical ob-
struction punishes a narrow range of conduct. For example,
assault," 6 battery," 7 and physical resistance to arrest" 8 might
115. See supra note 3.
116. Assault is conduct which "places another in reasonable apprehension of re-
ceiving a battery." ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 38, § 12-1 (Smith-Hurd 1979).
117. Battery is conduct which causes intentional bodily harm or makes physical
contact of an insulting or provoking nature; e.g., IL. STAT. ANN. ch. 38, § 12-3 (Smith-
Hurd 1979).
118. People v. Raby, 40 Ill. 2d 392, 240 N.E.2d 595, cert. denied 393 U.S. 1083 (1968)
(disorderly conduct became resistance to arrest where demonstrators intentionally
went limp after being told they were under arrest).
Although at one time the law permitted resistance to an unlawful arrest, physical
resistance is now generally acceptable to the courts only where an arresting officer
places defendant in imminent danger of physical harm. Compare Bad Elk v. United
States, 177 U.S. 529 (1900) with People v. Fort, 91 Ill. App. 2d 212, 234 N.E.2d 384 (1968)
("peace is best preserved when the citizen submits to arrest without regard to the
merits of the case .... Our courts have gone to great length to preserve the individ-
ual's right to an impartial trial and trial by combat has long been outlawed." Id. at
386). See also, People v. Locken, 59 Ill. 2d 459, 322 N.E.2d 51 (1975) (resistance to un-
lawful arrest by a known police officer is illegal); People v. Clinkscales, 19 ll. App. 3d
173, 311 N.E.2d 352 (1974) (person may use force to defend himself if officer uses exces-
sive force, thus placing him in danger of imminent infliction of death or great bodily
harm); and MODEL PENAL CODE § 242.2 comments at 215-19 (Final Draft 1980).
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constitute interference, although these may also be separate
offenses. Blocking rescue operations would be physical ob-
struction within the meaning of a narrowly drawn interference
statute.
However, mere argument is not physical obstruction.119
Words combined with force in threats,'120 harassment,1 2' and
119. Under the Model Penal Code, even resistance to arrest, accompanied with ver-
bal threats would not be proscribed under the resistance statute because "it is unlikely
that words alone could create a substantial risk of bodily harm or justify use of sub-
stantial force by the authorities" as the model statute requires. MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 242.2 comment at 220 (Final Draft 1980). The resistance section states:
A person commits a misdemeanor if, for the purpose of preventing a public
servant from effecting a lawful arrest or discharging any other duty, the person
creates a substantial risk of bodily injury to the public servant or anyone else,
or employs means justifying or requiring substantial force to overcome the
resistance.
Id.
120. An Illinois court found obstruction where a defendant removed his jacket and
revealed an (empty) shoulder holster while threatening to kill an officer. People v.
Conner, 42 Ill. App. 3d 234, 355 N.E.2d 662 (1976). Threats may also be treated as intimi-
dation under Illinois law.
(a) A person commits intimidation when, with intent to cause another to
perform or to omit the performance of any act, he communicates to another a
threat to perform without lawful authority any of the following acts:
(1) Inflict physical harm on the person threatened or any other person or
on property...
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 12-6 (1967), cited in People v. Galo, 54 Ill. 2d 343, 297 N.E.2d 569
(1973) (threatening to break legs of a borrower if he does not pay debt); see also Peo-
ple v. Cole, 57 Ill. App. 3d 396, 376 N.E.2d 106 (1978) (threatening to blow someone's
brains out); People v. Brown, 44 Ill. App. 3d 104, 357 N.E.2d 881 (1976) (threatening to
kill someone with a pistol).
Under New York Penal law, a person is guilty of "menacing" if, "by physical menace,
he intentionally places or attempts to place another person in fear of imminent serious
physical injury." N.Y. PENAL LAw § 120.15 (McKinney 1979).
121. For example, the MODEL PENAL CODE, § 250.4 (Final Draft 1980) reads: "A per-
son commits a petty misdemeanor if, with purpose to harass another, he: . . . (2) in-
sults, taunts or challenges another in a manner likely to provoke violent or disorderly
response."
N.Y. PENAL LAw § 240.25 (McKinney 1980) reads:
A person is guilty of harassment when, with intent to harass, annoy or alarm
another person:
1. He strikes, shoves, kicks or otherwise subjects him to physical contact,
or attempts or threatens to do the same; or
2. In a public place, he uses abusive or obscene language, or makes an ob-
scene gesture; or
3. He follows a person in or about a public place or places; or
4. As a student in school, college or other institution of learning, he en-
gages in conduct commonly called hazing; or
5. He engages in a course of conduct or repeatedly commits acts which
alarm or seriously annoy such other person and which serve no legitimate
purpose.
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the encouragement of illegal acts by others 122 have been found
to physically obstruct an officer. Brief emotional outbursts
such as Lashinsky's, however, have not been considered physi-
cal obstruction. 23 Thus, Lashinsky would not have been con-
Unlike disorderly conduct, where conviction depends on action with intent to cause
"public inconvenience," the harassment section prohibits conduct carried out with the
intent to harass or annoy "another person." Id. practice commentary at 300. Thus, it
would be inappropriate to charge someone with harassment under a disorderly con-
duct statute.
122. An Illinois court identified language that "falls between 'mere argument' with
an officer," which is protected expression, and "'some physical act,' which interferes."
People v. Gibbs, 115 Ill. App. 2d 113, 117, 253 N.E.2d 117, 120 (1969). The Illinois Court of
Appeals ruled it was interference to successfully encourage several youths being
searched by police on the street to resist arrest by entering a building and mingling
with some forty other youths, thus preventing the police from completing their arrests.
The court said that causing the officers to lose control of the youths they were search-
ing was an obstruction as much as a more direct physical interference. Id. The Illinois
court cited District of Columbia v. Little, 339 U.S. 1, 6 (1949) for the proposition that
force or threat of force is not an "indispensable ingredient" of interference. Gibbs, 115
Ill. App. at 117, 253 N.E.2d at 119.
See also, Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986 (2d Cir. 1973) (harrassment where photogra-
pher deliberately followed and touched Jacqueline Onassis); People v. Dorns, 88 Misc.
2d 1064, 390 N.Y.S.2d 546 (Town of Greenburgh Just. Ct. 1976) (harassment to stay in
plaintiff's apartment, follow her to her car, block her exist and threaten her life); Peo-
ple v. Fort, 91 Ill. App. 2d 212, 234 N.E.2d 384 (1968) (use of word "bullshit" in a "con-
temptuous and defiant connotation" may justify use of force by police in making an
arrest where officers feared that defendant's acquaintances who were "milling around
officers" might try to take defendant from custody).
123. Courts have generally ruled that emotional outbursts are not harrassment.
E.g., People v. Todaro, 26 N.Y.2d 325, 258 N.E.2d 711, 310 N.Y.S.2d 303 (1970) (Saying,
"I'll get you for this" after being arrested and placed in back seat of patrol car. This
was a "single, equivocal" statement falling short of harassment). Id. 26 N.Y.2d at 330,
258 N.E.2d at 713, 310 N.Y.S.2d at 308, People v. Caine, 70 Misc. 2d 178, 333 N.Y.S.2d 208
(Suffolk County Dist. Ct. 1972) (twice telling an officer to shove a summons up his "f-
a-," and twice to "Go f- yourself."); People v. Smolen, 69 Misc. 2d 920, 331 N.Y.S.2d 98
(N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1972) (accusing officer of harassing a peddler); People v. Benders, 63
Misc. 2d 572, 312 N.Y.S.2d 603 (Buffalo City Ct. 1970) (addressing officer with words
which "refer to a certain animal and its reputed incestuous proclivities"); People v.
Hotchkiss, 59 Misc. 2d 823, 300 N.Y.S.2d 405 (Schuyler County Ct. 1969) (saying to a
deputy sheriff after being relieved of a loaded pistol, "If I could have drawn my gun fast
enough, I would have shot you"). People v. Paradiso, 58 Misc. 2d 370, 295 N.Y.S.2d 561
(Ct. of Spec. Sess. Watkins Glen 1968).
But see, People v. Cuomo, 70 Misc. 2d 757, 335 N.Y.S.2d 219 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1972) (call-
ing an officer "you stupid bastard," "you son of a bitch" as he returns to his patrol car
constitutes "fighting words" which violate the prohibition against harassment).
Whether sharp words to a policeman constitute harassment under New York statute
may depend on whether the court considers police to be average people or people with
special tolerance for provocative language. Compare two cases where harassment was
not found, People v. Smolen, 69 Misc. 2d 920, 331 N.Y.S.2d 98 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1972) and
People v. Benders, 63 Misc. 2d 572, 312 N.Y.S.2d 603 (Buffalo City Ct. 1970), with People
v. Cuomo, 70 Misc. 2d 757, 335 N.Y.S.2d 219 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1972) where harassment was
found.
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victed under a narrowly drawn interference statute requiring
proof of physical interference.
D. Specific Intent
Lashinsky should not have been convicted without a finding
that he intended to interfere. A culpability or criminal intent
requirement narrows the scope of an interference statute-and
thereby the discretion of those who enforce it-"by exempting
innocent or inadvertent conduct from its proscription."' 24 By
requiring a showing of mens rea (culpability), a defendant is
permitted to introduce evidence about his character and repu-
tation that would be inadmissible under a strict liability stat-
ute. 25 Moreover, where a showing of culpability is required,
the prosecution must prove a specific criminal intent rather
than merely that the defendant's act was volitional. 126
Although specific criminal intent is not an element of some
"public welfare" offenses, 27 courts have frequently held that
criminal statutes are unconstitutionally vague if they do not
make conviction contingent on a showing of intent. Intent has
been of controlling importance in several decisions where free-
124. Landry v. Daley, 280 F. Supp. 938, 959 (N.D. Ill. 1968). Judge Will, in his opinion
for the court in Landry, is referring to the requirement in the Illinois obstruction and
resistence statute requiring a showing that a defendant "knowingly" resists or ob-
structs a law enforcement officer. See ILL REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 31-1 (Smith-Hurd 1979).
125. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 276 (1952). A defendant might also
introduce evidence of acts both before and after the criminal acts charged. People v.
Barton, 30 A.D.2d 726, 291 N.Y.S.2d 577 (N.Y. App. Div. 1968).
A culpability requirement also gives a defendant an added technical defense-where
a charge of intent is omitted from an information. See, e.g., People v. Hall, 48 N.Y.2d
927, 401 N.E.2d 179, 425 N.Y.S.2d 56 (1979).
An intent requirement may also prevent conduct from being punished as a lesser
included offense. People v. Alvarez, 66 Misc. 2d 205, 319 N.Y.S.2d 1017 (Sup. Ct. 1971)
(disorderly conduct is not a lesser included offense of harassment because disorderly
conduct requires an additional element of intent to cause public inconvenience).
126. In interpreting a federal statute punishing intentional threats against the pres-
ident, the Supreme Court said it is not the making of the threat that violates the law,
but the intent to carry it out. Watts v. U.S., 394 U.S. 705 (1969), citing 402 F.2d 676, 678
(D.C. Cir. 1968). But, in Lashinsky, the New Jersey Supreme Court said, "no .... spe-
cific intent, in the sense of awareness of unlawfulness or a motive to break the law, is
required in order to affix criminal responsibility for conduct which is otherwise voli-
tional and purposeful, and in fact brings about the impermissible result." Lashinsky,
81 NJ. at 11, 404 A.2d at 1126.
127. The label, "public welfare" offenses, given currency by Sayre, refers to decision
law which dispenses with the mental element in convictions for traffic violations and
for violations of food, drug, liquor and other regulations. Sayre, Public Welfare Of-
fenses, 33 COLum. L REv. 55 (1933).
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dom of expression or association was at issue.'28 A Kentucky
disorderly conduct statute passed constitutional muster only
after the Supreme Court was satisfied that the Kentucky
Supreme Court had imposed an intent requirement in the
law.'29 Similarly, in a trespass suit, a Colorado court found that,
under the first amendment, the plaintiff must show the defend-
ant reporter either knew he was trespassing or that he tres-
passed with reckless disregard.
30
Arguably, proof of criminal intent should not be required for
minor crimes where the stigma of criminal sanctions is
128. E.g., Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961); Yates v. United States, 354 U.S.
298 (1957); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
129. Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 108 (1972).
However, in a poorly reasoned opinion, the Supreme Court shifted the definition so
that the prosecution did not have to demonstrate defendant's intent to be disruptive
but instead had to prove either that the defendant had "no bonafide intent to exercise
a constitutional right" or that "the interest to be advanced by the particular exercise of
a constitutional right is insignificant in comparison with the inconvenience, annoyance
or alarm caused by the exercise." Id. at 108-09 (emphasis supplied). Neither of these
criteria for determining "predominant" intent necessary requires a showing of "intent
to cause public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm" as the state statute required. Id.
at 198, quoting KY. REV. STAT. § 437.016(1)(f) (Supp. 1968). The fact that Colten may
not have intended to exercise a "bona fide" first amendment right when he persist-
ently tried to question a police officer does not establish that he intended to interfere.
Proof of a negative does not prove a positive. Justice Douglas thought Colten's ques-
tions about a traffic citation issued to a friend were constitutionally protected as
speech "to a representative of government." Colten, 407 U.S. at 121 (Douglas, J., dis-
senting).
The alternative test-that the constitutional interest be insignificant in comparison
with the public inconvenience caused by its exercise-is not an inquiry into intent at
all. It is simply a balancing test. In Colten, the balance shifted easily in the state's
favor once the court cavalierly determined that Colten's first amendment contentions
were "near-frivolous." Id. at 109.
The Appeals Court of Kentucky, which the Supreme Court affirmed, had employed a
social value test to exclude Colten's conduct from constitutional consideration. This
social value test, normally used to exclude obscenity from constitutional protection, is
inappropriately applied to expression addressed to a police officer. Only a year after
Colten, but with no reference to the case, the Supreme Court ruled that a rude refusal
to answer an officer's questions was not disorderly conduct, but was expression pro-
tected by the first amendment. Norwell v. City of Cincinnati, 414 U.S. 14 (1973). The
Supreme Court summarily excluded Colten's expression from constitutional consider-
ation, apparently for lack of "social value." It would have been more appropriate for
the Court to treat Colten's questions as protected expression subject to limitations as
to time, place and manner, or to complete supression if they produced a clear and
present danger of substantive evil "that rises far above public inconveniences, annoy-
ance, or unrest." Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 237 (1963). The lower court
opinion is at 467 S.W.2d 374 (1971).
130. Allen v. Combined Communications, 7 MEDIA L REP. (BNA) 2417, 2420 (Colo.
Dist. Ct. 1981).
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slight,'3 ' but a misdemeanor disorderly conduct or interference
conviction can lead to a stigmatizing fine or a jail term. Fur-
ther, a journalist may lose his sources and his credibility with
the public if he is arrested or convicted for a misdemeanor.
The stigma associated with an interference conviction suggests
that a showing of specific criminal intent in the prosecution of
a journalist may be required under the first amendment.
There are several recognized levels of culpability that may
be required under a misdemeanor statute. The Model Penal
Code, which requires a different standard of culpability for dif-
ferent crimes, 132 recommends the most demanding level of cul-
pability-purposeful or intentional conduct-for the crime of
obstruction. 133 Several states, including New Jersey, have fol-
lowed the Model Code and now make conviction for obstruc-
tion contingent on a showing of purposeful interference or
physical interference.'34 Other jurisdictions require a less de-
manding showing that the defendant's interference was
"knowing.' ' 35 On the other hand, the drafters of the Model Pe-
nal Code recommend a still less demanding culpability ele-
ment-recklessness-for a disorderly conduct statute.
36
131. Packer suggests this may have been Mr. Justice Jackson's point in his opinion
for the Court in Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952). See, Packer, Mens Rea
and the Supreme Court, 1962 SuP. CT. REV. 107. Packer concludes that "[n]o one
should be sentenced to imprisonment or its equivalent without being afforded the op-
portunity to litigate the issue of mens rea." Id. at 150.
132. See, MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 nn.123-33 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
133. A person commits a misdemeanor if he "purposely" obstructs, impairs or per-
verts the administration of law. MODEL PENAL CODE § 242.1 (Official Draft 1980).
A person acts purposely with respect to a material element of an offense when:
(1) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or a result thereof, it is
his conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature of to cause such a
result; and
(2) if the element involves the attendant circumstances, he knows of the
existence of such circumstances.
Id. at § 2.02(2) (a) (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
134. See supra note 106.
135. A person acts knowingly ,with respect to a material element of an offense when:
(1) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or the attendant cir-
cumstances, he knows that his conduct is of that nature or he knows of the
existence of such circumstances; and
(2) if the element involves a result of his conduct, he knows that his con-
duct will necessarily cause such a result.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2) (b) (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
136. Under terms of the model code, disorderly conduct could lead to conviction if a
defendant acted either "with purpose to cause public inconvenience ... or "recklessly
creating a risk thereof." MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.2 (Official Draft 1980). A person acts
recklessly, according to the Model code, when he "consciously disregards a substantial
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Under each of these standards of culpability a defendant is
protected because the prosecution must show that the defend-
ant deliberately engaged in conduct he knew was illegal or that
he disregarded the risks of his conduct. A general intent to act,
as opposed to a purposeful, knowing or reckless mental state
with regard to the illegal results of the act, would not be suffi-
cient for conviction.'37 Certainly evidence of culpability is more
likely to be found where there is considerable evidence of
physical blocking and obstruction, 138 but observable behavior
alone is not dispositive. 139 A defendant's intent to act illegally
should be verified by the fact-finder before he may be con-
victed of interference.
In Morissette v. United States,"4 the Supreme Court sug-
and unjustifiable risk" that some result will occur. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2) (c)
(Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
137. See supra note 126. Also insufficient for conviction would be a showing of neg-
ligence. Negligent conduct, which is behavior that one "should have known" would
lead to illegal results, is not a culpability requirement because it does not require con-
sciousness of the likely results of the actor's actions. See MODEL PENAL CODE,
§ 2.02(2) (d) (Tent. Draft, 1955) and J. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRimiNAL LAw 135-
41 (2d ed. 1960).
At best, the Supreme Court, in Colten v. Kentucky, used a negligence standard, even
though the Kentucky disorderly conduct statute required that conviction be based on
conduct where the defendant had the "intent to cause public inconvenience, annoy-
ance or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof." 407 U.S. 104, 108 (1972). "Any
person," the Court said, "who stands in a group of persons along a highway where the
police are investigating a traffic violation and seeks to engage the attention of an officer
issuing a summons should understand that he could be convicted" of disorderly con-
duct if he fails to move on. Id. at 110 (emphasis added).
138. See, e.g., People v. Pettigrew, 69 Misc. 2d 985, 332 N.Y.S.2d 33 (Suffolk County
Dist. Ct. 1972) (risk of public inconvenience found where man dressed as turkey, work-
ing with a man dressed as Santa Claus, failed to move on after drawing a crowd of 150
that blocked the sidewalk and part of the street).
139. E.g., People v. Gingello, 67 Misc. 2d 224, 324 N.Y.S.2d 122 (Rochester City Ct.
1971) (no proven "conscious disruptive intent" where, late at night, defendant says in a
loud, clear voice to an officer, "You are an a-hole") 67 Misc.2d at 225, 324 N.Y.S.2d at
122. See also, People v. Ithaca Savings Bank, 59 Misc. 2d 128, 298 N.Y.S.2d 257 (Ithaca
City Ct. 1969) (no intent to be disorderly where playing a carillon three times a day
caused private annoyance); People v. Doe, 85 Misc. 2d 592, 380 N.Y.S.2d 549 (Utica City
Ct. 1976) (no intent to cause public inconvenience where defendant did not engage in
tumultuous behavior until put under arrest, and resistance to arrest is not disorderly
conduct).
Similarly, New York courts have not found intent to harass where defendant en-
gaged in single, though crude, emotional outbursts towards an officer. People v.
Todaro, 26 N.Y.2d 325, 310 N.Y.S.2d 303 (1970); People v. Caine, 70 Misc. 2d 178, 333
N.Y.S.2d 208 (Suffolk County Dist. Ct. 1972).
140. 342 U.S. 246 (1952). The Supreme Court reversed a conviction for lack of proof
of criminal intent where defendant was sentenced to two months in jail or a fine of $200
for openly taking $84 worth of spent military shell casings.
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gested a jury could determine whether a defendant wrongfully
intended to steal $84 worth of spent government shell casings
by considering Morissette's character, the openness of the tak-
ing and the candor with which he admitted the taking.141 If a
jury had been permitted to consider Lashinsky's character and
conduct to determine his intent, it would have concluded that
he had no specific intent to interfere. Lashinsky parked his car
along the side of the road, stayed several feet from the wreck
and backed up when first ordered away. Lashinsky did not ini-
tiate his argument with Officer Herkloz or deliberately attract
or incite a crowd. In addition, his good character is indicated
by his possession of a press pass which is issued by law en-
forcement officers after an investigation of the applicant's char-
acter.142 His unfortunate conviction manifests the vagueness
of the New Jersey disorderly conduct statute which failed to
specify that to be convicted the defendant must have a specific
intent to interfere.
Conclusion
Reconciling the interests of officers and journalists at news
scenes is a difficult proposition. As officers need broad discre-
tion at dangerous events, the tendency of some officers to
abuse that discretion and the inherent difficulty of defining in-
terference suggest the chances of reducing the press-police
conflict through legislation are limited. Indeed, the range of
potential police-press conflicts is so broad that the possibility
of rationalizing a proper standard to restrict access seems re-
mote. 143 As a result, regardless of the precision with which in-
terference statutes may be drawn, press access will depend on
good faith cooperation between officials and journalists as well.
While narrowly drawn statutes will not guarantee a uniform
news scene access rule, such statutes should receive press
support. A narrowly drawn interference statute, most impor-
tantly, limits official discretion, and mitigates the uncertainty a
journalist suffers as to the scope of his access right under a
vague statute. Further, a narrow interference statute provides
141. Id.
142. See note 54 supra and accompanying text.
143. See Denniston, Court spreads 'disease of rationality', 7 MEDIA L. NOTES 3
(1979) (quarterly publication of the law division of the Association for Education in
Journalism and Mass Communication and the Mass Communications Law Section of
the Association of American Law Schools).
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an opportunity for a journalist to question an official's decision
to deny him access. Although there may be a need of formal
recognition of the journalist's first amendment right of access
to the news scene, the media may be much more successful in
lobbying for interference statutes that are clear and precise.
Narrowly drawn interference statutes, buttressed by journal-
ists' emerging right of access to the news scene, shall check
police discretion, thereby reducing conflicts between journal-
ists and officials.
